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THE LEGISLATIVE ROLES IN
FLORIDA'S JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
JEFFRY A. P.uu _ss*
INTRODUaTION

In his recent work in this review,1 Ernest Means made a significant contribution to the study of the relationships between the judicial and legislative
branches of state governments and their proper roles. The work focuses on the
promulgation of rules of practice and procedure by the supreme court of
Florida, and on the role of the Florida Legislature during the rulemaking
process. The work traces extensively the historical development of the procedural rulemaking power in Florida,2 and identifies three significant stages
in the development of this power. They consist of the pre-constitutional rulemaking stage, 3 the stage in which the Florida courts' rulemaking power was
first defined by the constitution,4 and the present stage. In this present stage, a
recent Florida constitutional amendment empowers the supreme court to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the courts of the state and enables the legislature to repeal any such rules by a two-thirds vote of each house.5
Means' article analyzes this amendment by examining its language, intent and
judicial interpretation. The article concludes with the rather cogent argument
that the Florida supreme court has strayed from the constitutional role assigned it by the amendment's framers. It contends that the Florida supreme
court was wrong in finding its rulemaking power exclusive, in that legislative
participation in the regulation of practice and procedure beyond the repeal
of rules promulgated by the court is foreclosed. It asserts that the court's determination conflicts with the literal constitutional language,6 with the intent
of the framers,7 and with democratic principle.8
It is the third assertion, involving the court's alleged undermining of the
*Associate Professor of Law, C. Blake McDowell Law Center, University of Akron; B.A.,
1970, Colby College; J.D., 1974, University of Chicago.
1. Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA.
L. Rav. 442 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Procedure in Florida Courts]. For a condensed version
of this work see Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, 54
FA. BJ. 276 (1980).
2. For a work exploring the early history of Florida judicial rulemaking, see Note, The
Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone Between Substance and
Procedure,24 U. FYA. L. Rv. 87 (1971).
3. Procedurein Florida Courts, supra note 1, at 444-46. The first stage ran from statehood
to July 1, 1957 and consisted of recurrent statutory delegations of procedural rulemaking
power to the high court.
4. Id. at 446-48. The second stage ran from 1957 to 1972 and embodied a constitutional
provision stating court procedure "shall be governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court."
Fla. HJ.R. 810 (Reg. Sess. 1955) (adopted Nov. 6, 1956 as FLA. CONST. art. V, effective July 1,
1957).
5. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(a).
6. Procedure in FloridaCourts, supra note 1, at 458-61.
7. Id. at 461-67.

8. Id, at 47Q-81,
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democratic or organizing principle9 which prompts this commentary. Means
contends that the democratic principle "assigns the primary role in the determination of public policy to the legislative branch of Florida government."'10
Therefore, he reasons, the court's assumption of exclusive rulemaking responsibility has undermined this principle by usurping legislative participation in
the policy issue determinations inherent in the promulgation of procedural
rules.", Comment on this discussion of democratic principle seems appropriate
for several reasons. First, while Florida's legislature, as all state legislatures, is
constitutionally assigned the primary role in the determination of public
policy, there are certain areas within which a primary role is assigned to either
the executive or judicial branches. Second, the view that legislative participation in procedural rulemaking is foreclosed by the court's determination of
exclusivity assumes that the primary role in determining the policy issues inherent in judicial rulemaking is maintained only by the governmental branch
which promulgates those rules. I believe, however, that the Florida Legislature
can play a primary role, although it lacks ultimate rulemaking responsibility.
In fact, I find examples in the noted work of the Florida supreme court's willingness to allow the Florida Legislature to play an active, even primary role in
the promulgation of controversial, issue-laden procedural rules. The third and
final reason for this comment is that, notwithstanding my disagreement with
the author's rationale in finding violations of democratic principle, I too find
democracy undermined in the Florida supreme court's interpretation of its
procedural rulemaking power. Democratic principles mandate implementation
of "public process in judicial rulemaking.' 12 The Florida supreme court has
failed to meet this mandate.
CONSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY

As indicated, Ernest Means' work suggests that the democratic principle
underlying the Florida constitution "assigns the primary role in the determination of public policy to the legislative branch of Florida government."' s
Since his work correctly finds that "policy issues appropriate to legislative
determination" exist within both procedural rules and substantive laws," it
concludes that the promulgation of procedural court rules lies within the
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 476.
Id.
Id. at 477. See also C. SANDS, I STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUMTON §3.27 (4th ed.

1972).
12. Parness & Manthey, Public Process and State Judicial Rulemaking, I PAcE L. REv.
121,130 (1980).
13. Procedure in Florida Courts,supra note 1, at 476.

14. Id. at 477. The work suggests that the democratic principle would not be severely
undermined by exclusive Supreme Court authority over rules "related solely to the orderly
dispatch of judicial business." Id. at 485. Yet it fails to distinguish further between procedural
rules reflecting major policy issue determinations and those reflecting minimal or no policy
determinations. Id. at 476-81. Recognition of these distinctions is crucial to any complete
discussion of the proper roles of the Legislature and the Supreme Court in the adoption of
procedural court rules. See Parness, Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J.
1319, 1322 (1979) (Letter to the editors); Parness & Manthey, supra note 12, at 125-25.
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"legitimate legislative authority" of the Florida Legislature.- Accordingly, the
Florida supreme court's determination that its procedural rulemaking power
is exclusive is deemed incorrect, because it limits the legislature's participation
in procedural regulation to the veto power. The work declares: "It is utterly
hopeless to attempt to reconcile any notion of an exclusive judicial rulemaking
authority with generally accepted tenets of democracy."6
A cursory examination of both state and federal constitutions reveal several
instances where the ultimate responsibility for "policy issues appropriate to
legislative determination"'17 is assigned to one of the non-legislative branches
of government. Duties involving determinations of public policy are often
assigned to the executive or judicial branches, although these duties are, manifestly, legislative in nature. It may well be that such assignments are required
by yet another organizing principle underlying all American constitutions: the
principle of checks and balances.
With respect to the executive branch, the United States Constitution assigns to the President legislative roles in both domestic and foreign affairs. The
President is to "nominate ... Public Ministers";18 "to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment";1 9 and to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 20 Further,
the President is to "nominate ...Ambassadors" ' 1 and to act as "Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States when called into actual service of the United States." 22 In fulfilling these assignments the President often makes determinations of public
23
policy.
The Florida supreme court's avowed exclusive power over procedural rulemaking is similar to the exercise of at least one Presidential power. The Florida
supreme court is constitutionally authorized to adopt rules of practice and
procedure for all Florida courts, subject to repeal by two-thirds vote of each
house of the Florida Legislature. 24 The President is vested with the power to
nominate and, by and with the Senate's advice and consent, to appoint Judges
of the United States Supreme Court.25 In finding its rulemaking power exclusive, the Florida supreme court concluded that although the Florida Legislature could repeal procedural rules, it had "no constitutional authority to enact
any law relating to practice and procedure."'2 6 Furthermore, it appears well
established that, while the Senate can veto the proposed appointment of a
Supreme Court justice, it cannot nominate a candidate of its choice. Thus, the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Procedurein FloridaCourts,supra note 1,at 485.
ld. at 477.
Id.at 476.
U.S. CoNsr. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
Id.d. 1.
Id. §3.

21. Id. §2, ci. 2.
22. Id.d. 1.
23. For example, consider the pardon of former President Nixon by then President Ford.
24. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, §2(a).
25. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §2, d.2.
26. In re Clarification of Fla. RuIcs Qf rra. & PrQo., 281 So. 2d 204, 204 (Fla. 1978).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

President's power to nominate is exclusive, although such Presidential action
clearly necessitates public policy judgments. 2
The Florida Constitution provides an example of an explicit assignment of
legislative, policy making authority to the judicial branch. That constitution
states that the Florida supreme court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of
persons so admitted." 28 Although Means' article would clearly characterize
rules relating to admission to legal practice and professional discipline as expressions of public policy, 29 it fails to suggest that the constitution assign
exclusive responsibility for these rules to the Florida Legislature. Perhaps the
author felt that the possibility of legislative tampering with court procedures
would jeopardize judicial independence,30 or that the advantages of court
initiative and experience would be eliminated from the rulemaking process. 81
The Florida Constitution is not unique in its express and implied grants
of exclusive power over judicial rules to the state high court. Many state constitutions expressly insulate portions of this judicial rulemaking authority from
effective legislative control. Examples include rules regulating admission to
the practice of law and professional discipline,3 2 as well as rules relating to
practice and procedure, 32 and to superintendence. 4 One state constitution goes
27. For example, consider the contemporary debates about what roles, if any, sex, race
and religion should play in the selection of United States Court Justices.
28. FLA. CONST. art. V, §15.
29. Procedurein FloridaCourts, supra note 1, at 477-81.
30. Id. at 483.
31. Id. It should be noted that others in Florida are currently trying to divest the Florida
supreme court of its exclusive jurisdiction to regulate admission and discipline, and invest
the Florida Legislature with such jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hume, Why Doesn't the Florida Bar
do Something?, 53 FLA. B.J. 570 (1979). But see, e.g., D'Alemberte, Sunset Review? Yes. Abolish
the Bar? No, 53 FLA. B.J. 576 (1979); England, In Defense of Regulation by the Supreme
Court, 54 FLA. B.J. 254 (1980).
32. E.g., ARK. CONST. amend. XXVIII. "The Supreme Court shall make rules regulating
the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law." Id. For cases interpreting
this amendment and determining the court's power to be exclusive and supreme. See In re
Pitchford, 265 Ark. 752, 581 S.W.2d 321 (1979); McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 500 S.W.2d
357 (1973). See also PA. CONST. art. V, §10(c). "The Supreme Court shall have power to prescribe general rules . . . for admission to the bar and to [the] practice of law .... All laws
shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these
provisions." Id. For an interpretation finding that admission to the practice of law in Pennsylvania is a judicial function exercised exclusively by the supreme court, with the aid of the
State Board of Bar Examiners, see Appeal of Murphy, 482 Pa. 43, 393 A.2d 369, cert. denied,
440 U.S. 901 (1978).
33. ARuZ. CONST. art. VI, §5. "The Supreme Court shall have . . . power to make rules
relative to all procedural matters in any court." Id. For cases which interpret the provision
as finding the power to make procedural rules vested exclusively in the supreme court see
State v. Blazak, 105 Ariz. 216, 462 P.2d 84 (1969), afl'd on other grounds, 110 Ariz. 202, 516
P.2d 575 (1973); Arizona Podiatry Ass'n v. Director of Ins., 101 Ariz. 544, 422 P.2d 108 (1966).
See also MICH. CONST. art. VI, §5 "The supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify,
amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts .. " Id. For courts finding the
function of enacting judicial rules of practice and procedure to have been committed exclusively by the constitution to the high court, see In re Sunshine Law, 400 Mich. 660, 255
N.W.2d 635 (1977); Perin v. Peuler, 373 Mich. 531, 130 N.W.2d 4 (1964).
34. MiC. CONST. art. VI, §4. "The supreme court shall have general superintending con-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss3/3

4

Parness: The Legislative Roles in Florida's Judicial Rulemaking
FLORIDA'S JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

so far as to place the judicial department's budget beyond legislative control. 35
Several constitutional provisions surpass those of Florida in creating exclusive

judicial rulemaking authority, which is not subject to legislative veto by a
majority or supermajority vote. 36 According to the noted work, this unfettered

judicial rulemaking is even more undemocratic than the Florida supreme
court's exclusive authority.

In the absence of an express grant, some state constitutions have been construed to grant implicitly to the high court such exclusive rulemaking author-

ity.37 Means seems to condone findings of implied constitutional authority for

unfettered judicial rulemaking, at least where the rules are "related solely to
the orderly dispatch of judicial business and did not infringe upon, change, or

affect any substantive right."38
THE LEGISLATURE's RoLEs iN ExcLusIvE
SuPRa-E CouRT RULEMAKNG

Regardless of whether or not the Florida supreme court subverted the
democratic principle by misreading the wording and intent of the procedural
rulemaking provision, its decision on exclusivity seems firmly established1 9
Though I disagree with the noted work's position on democratic principle, I
share its concern for the necessity of legislative participation in the public
policy decisions attending procedural rulemaking, particularly where rules are
"socially significant40 and do not lie in the "vast range of technical matter
which is the bulk of adjective law." 1
Notwithstanding the Florida supreme court's holding that the legislature
trol over all courts . " I.
Id. See In re Sunshine Law, 400 Mich. 660, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977)
(constitution entrusted supervisory and administrative powers exclusively to the judiciary).
35. W. VA. CONsr. art. VI, §51(B). "[N]o [budgetary] item relating to the judiciary shall
be decreased." Id. See Bagley v. Blankenship, 246 S.E.2d 99 (1978) (finding that the constitution bans both the legislature and Governor from altering the judiciary's budget).
36.

See, e.g., ARrz. CONS?. art. VI, §5; MICH. CONS?. art. VI, §§4, 5; PA. CONS?. art. V,

§10(c).

37. E.g., State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971) in invalidating certain
statutes, the courts found rules governing procedure and admission to practice, to be within
the judicial function derived from a constitutional provision dividing the powers of government into three departments and foreclosing each from exercising the power of another);
Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528 (1949). Accord, Kolkman v. People 89
Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931); State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d

176 (1969).
38. Procedure in Florida Courts, supra note 1, at 484-85.
39. This is apparently recognized in the noted work which finds that "any doubt that may
have been engendered . . . that the Supreme Court had meant what it said in . . . In re

Clarification was soon dispelled." Id. at 457. The work refers to two later Florida supreme
court decisions, Markert v. Johnson, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978); Avila South Condo. Ass'n
v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977). Id.
40. Parness & Manthey, supra note 12, at 125. The rules have also been described as
affecting "sensitive issues of social policy." Wright, Book Review, 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 652, 656
(1978).
41. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-making: A Problem in
ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1958).
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has "no constitutional authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure,"42 the legislature should not be foreclosed from participating in the
regulation of practice and procedure. Rather, the legislature should participate
both in the early stages of the court's rulemaking process and after the court
finally adopts a procedural rule through the exercise of a veto power. This dual
legislative participation in the public policy determinations of procedural rulemaking can be incorporated into the court's otherwise exclusive authority if
the court implements a system resembling "public process rulemaking." 43 Advocates of public process rulemaking agree that judicial rulemaking often
necessitates policy issue determinations and, therefore, constitutes a legislative
act. 44 Thus, they urge that judicial rules should be adopted only after public
debate involving both lawyers and nonlawyers, with the lay public represented,
45
at least in part, by the legislature.
As the noted work recognized, the Florida supreme court has allowed early
legislative participation in procedural rulemaking since finding its authority
exclusive. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such early participation occurred during the adoption of the procedural rules of evidence. The Florida
supreme court adopted, without change, the evidence rules which had already
been adopted by a unanimous legislature. 46 If the court had been unwilling to
accept the legislature's active (primary) participation in the policy issue judgments of procedural rulemaking, the court could have found unconstitutional
certain parts of the legislature's evidence code. 4 7 In other states, high courts
with exclusive rulemaking authority have also deferred to legislative actions
regarding judicial rules. 48 Thus, in Florida, the exclusivity of the court's procedural rulemaking power forecloses neither active legislative participation
nor public process rulemaking.
PUBLIC PROCMSS AND SUPREME COURT RULEMAKING

The concept of public process rulemaking has recently generated both
reform 49 and commentary. 50 Rulemaking mechanisms that guarantee increased
42. In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Prac. & Proc., 281 So. 2d 204, 204 (Fla. 1973).
43. Parness & Manthey, supra note 12.
44. Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Reexamination, 61 A.B.A.J.
579 (1975); Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
905 (1976); Wheeler, Broadening Participationin the Courts Through Rulemaking and Administration,62 JUDICATURE 280 (1.979).
45.

R. GRAu, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: ADMINISTRATION,

ACCESS AND AccouNTABmrry, 7-22

(American Judicature Society, 1978); Parness, supra note 14, at 1320-21; Weinstein, supra note
44, at 922-27.
46. In re Fla. Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699, 701 (8th Cir. 1971);
State v. Blazak, 105 Ariz. 216, 219, 462 P.2d 84, 86 (1969); Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300
P.2d 575, 585 (1931); Application of Kaufman, 79 Idaho 297, 314-15, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (1949);
Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat.. Bank of Little Rock, 224 Ark. 48, 54, 273 S.W.2d 408, 412
(1954).
49. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§9-3-65 to 9-3-73 (1975) (Mississippi's Advisory Committee
on Rules of Civil Procedure); OR. REv. STAT. §§1.725-1.750 (1977) (Oregon's Council on Court
Procedures); MICH. GEN. CT. R., 927 and 933; NEV. R. AD. DOCKET (adopted June 7, 1978);
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public access have been implemented through adoption of local court rules
and practices,51 as well as through legislative5 2 and judicial 3 action. Recent
commentary applauds these accomplishments and urges further action.5"
Public process rulemaking is desirable for several reasons. First, it is consistent with democratic principles. 5 Second, it legitimizes judicial rulemaking,
particularly where judges are not publicly elected.5 6 Finally, public process
rulemaking promotes public acceptance of adopted rules 57 and broadens the
foundation upon which judicial rules are erected.55
This actionO and commentary- alike reflect agreement that public participation in high court rulemaking can be increased by establishing wellknown, 1 permanent 2 rulemaking mechanisms which provide adequate notice
N.D. Sup. Cr. R. (adopted March 15, 1978) (procedural and administrative rules); N.D. LOCAL
Cr. R. (adopted March 15, 1978) (procedural and administrative rules).
50. For earlier works, see, e.g., Lesnick, supra note 44; Weinstein, supra note 44; Weinstein, Reform of the Federal Rule.making Process, 63 A.B.A. J. 47 (1977); J. WEIsTmN, REFoRm oF CouRT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (Ohio St. U. 1977).
51. For local court rules establishing judicial conferences of judges and lawyers whose
purpose is to render advice on the most effective methods of administering justice, see, e.g.,
IsT Cm. R. 6; 6TH Cm R. 15. Typically, rulemaking mechanisms for local court rules operate
on a traditional or informal basis, without formal rules on rulemaking. For example, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio recently employed a special
review committee to examine the rules of that Court. 53 Omo ST. B. Ass'N REP. 1188 (1980).
Yet, that Court's local rules mention no such committees, although similar committees have
apparently seen intermittent use during the past thirty years. See letter from W. R. Hardy to
J. Parness (August 12, 1980) (on file with author).
52. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§9-3-65 to -73 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. §§1.725-.750 (1977).
53. Mici. GEN. Cr. R. 927 and 933; NEv. R. AD. DocKET; N.D. LOCAL Cr. R.; NJ). SuP.
Cr. R.
54. R. GRAY, supra note 45; Parness, supra note 14; Parness & Manthey, supra note 12.
55. Thus, public process judicial rulemaking might effectively reconcile "exclusive judicial
rulemaking authority with generally accepted tenets of democracy." Procedure in Florida
Courts,supra note 1, at 477.
56. Professor Lesnick found that federal rulemaking fails to meet "the expectations of
our constitutional traditions." Lesnick, supra note 44, at 582. See also Parness, supra note 14,

at 1323.
57. Parness & Manthey, supra, note 12, at 132.
58. Id. at 131.
59. See note 49 supra.
60. See notes 50 & 54 supra.
61. R. GRAu, supra note 45, at 52; Lesnick, supra note 44, at 580; Weinstein, supra note
44, at 933; Wheeler, supra note 44, at 285.
Professor Lesnick best described the rationale supporting a known rulemaking mechanism: "in authorizing the Judicial Conference to 'carry on a continuous study of the
operation and effect' of the rules and to recommend changes ... Congress said nothing about
the procedure by which the conference should carry out the task. Nor has the conference itself
seen fit to publish procedural rules or even an informal statement describing its procedures.
What we know about the method by which rules are drafted and considered comes largely
from speeches or articles by judges active in the work of the Judicial Conference.
Were the conference to state and publish its procedures, it not only would enhance the
awareness of interested persons and thereby facilitate their participation; it also would find
itself required to face explicitly the question whether its procedures now provide adequate
means for obtaining a broad range of input." Lesnick, supra note 44, at 580.
62. The establishment of ad hoc rulemaking mechanisms guarantees neither continuity
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and opportunity to be heard,63 attempt to assure a reasoned basis for decision, 64
and allow public initiative.65 However, the most effective method of implementing these public process features varies with the social significance of a rule,6
the reviewability of a high court's rulemaking decisions, 67 and the need for
expeditious rule promulgation.68 In Florida, formal participation by the legislature in the early stages of supreme court rulemaking is particularly appropriate. The exclusivity described by the constitutional provision on procedural
court rules limits formal legislative review of the court's rulemaking action to
a super-majority veto. 69 The constitutional section on admission to legal practice and professional discipline apparently forecloses all formal legislative
o
review of supreme court action.7
The Florida supreme court has been quite active in exercising its constitutional authority to make rules of procedure. The court has promulgated rules
of civil, criminal and appellate procedure, as well as specialized rules of procedure and administration for many other substantive legal areas. 7 1 In addition, the court has promulgated admission and disciplinary rules for the Florida Bar, as well as integration rules, a code of professional responsibility, a code
of judicial conduct, and other miscellaneous rules regulating legal practice in
Florida72
The Florida supreme court has already implemented certain ingredients of
public process rulemaking. For example, in promulgating the appellate rules,
nor accessability at times when the rulemaker has no mechanism in operation. The Ohio
supreme court has regularly employed ad hoc advisory committees to assist in rulemaking,
and has been criticized for doing so by this author. Parness & Manthey, Public Process and
Ohio Supreme Court Rulemaking, 28 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 249 (1979).
63. R. GRAu, supra note 45, at 54-55; Lesnick, supra note 44, at 580; Parness 8 Manthey,
supra note 12, at 134-39; Weinstein, supra note 44, at 943, 963.
64. Parness & Manthey, supra note 12, at 139-41; Weinstein, supra note 44, at 963; The
rulemaker's failure to explicate the need for new rules creates difficulties both during subsequent legislative review of high court rulemaking activity and during later attempts to implement the new rules. In Ohio, the [egislature rejected the supreme court's final set of proposed
rules of evidence, in part, due to the absence of comments accompanying the rules. Walinski
& Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against, 28 CAsE W.L. REV.
344, 350 (1978). A subsequent set of proposed evidence rules, accompanied by comments,
recently became law. OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENcE WITH STAFF
NOTES (1980).
65. Public initiative refers to the opportunity of any interested individual to prompt
consideration of a new rule or rule amendments. See, e.g., R. GRAU, supra note 45, at 55;
Parness & Manthey, supra note 12. at 143; Weinstein, supra note 44, at 964.
66. Parness, supra note 14, at 1322.
67. Id. at 1323.
68. Id. at 1322.
69. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(a).
70. Id. §15. See also In re The Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975); In re The Florida
Bar-Code of Judicial Conduct, 28]. So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1973).
71. WEsT's DESK Copy: FLORIDA RULES OF COURT (rev. ed. 1981).
72. The court has made procedural rules for the following areas: probate and guardianship, traffic court, summary procedure, juvenile procedure, workmen's compensation and
medical mediation, as well as rules of judicial administration. Id. See also letter from C. J.
England to J. Parness (March 12, 1979) (on file with author).
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the court sought proposals from the Appellate Rules Committee of the Florida
Bar and asked an Advisory Committee on Rules to study the proposals. 78 It
heard oral argument on the proposed rules after the committees had completed
their recommendations. 74 Further, while any justice of the Florida supreme
court may initiate consideration of new or existing rules,75 either the Florida
Bar or a special court appointed committee may petition the court to amend
76
procedural rules, with such requests automatically set for oral argument. Although petitions from others are also allowed, they are considered by the court
77
in conference only upon approval of the Internal Rules Committee
The Florida supreme court should adopt more specific rules to govern the
exercise of its procedural rulemaking authority. Such rules should permit and
encourage involvement of the Florida Legislature and other interested parties.
Rules to govern the rulemaking would help to resolve the difficulties created
by the legislature's non-participation in judicial rulemaking, while preserving
the court's position of exclusivity and, therefore, independence. In other
jurisdictions, rules on high court rulemaking have been formally adopted. 78
These rules implicitly recognize that these judicial decisions often involve
public policy determinations, and that the public and its elected legislators are
entitled to access to the court's rulemaking process prior to final action.
CONCLUSION

In his recent work in this review, Ernest Means made a significant contribution to the dialogue on the Florida supreme court's procedural rulemaking

power. His article, however, overstated the extent to which the court's power
has undermined the democratic principle underlying the Florida Constitution.
Within a democratic government in the United States, there exist certain
areas within which ultimate responsibility for the resolution of public policy
issues can be granted to the judicial or executive branch. In Florida, the power
to adopt court rules of practice and procedure has been constitutionally granted

to the Florida supreme court, subject to the legislature's veto. The court has
found this exclusive, in that the legislature cannot initiate such rules without
court sanction. Such exclusive court power does not mean, however, that the
legislature cannot play an active or primary role in the resolution of policy
issues which procedural rulemaking often necessitates. Through utilization of
procedures derived from public process rulemaking, the Florida supreme court
can preserve its exclusive authority while assuring the public that its elected
legislature will actively participate in the promulgation of rules of court procedure.
73. In re Proposed Florida Appellate Rules, 351 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1977).
74. Id.
75. THE

SUPREME

COURT oF FLORIDA MANUAL

oF INTERNAL

OPERATING PROCEDURES,

§H1

F(l).
76. Id. §11 F(3).
77. Id.

78. See note 49 supra.
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